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PRICE v. INS-
'LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME"
I. INTRODUCTION
The shores of this country once provided refuge to those
suffocated by oppressive governments abroad. Immigrants
were drawn here in hopes of living a life protected by the free-
doms of the Bill of Rights. In the face of the Ninth Circuit
decision in Price v. INS,1 however, refuge for permanent resi-
dent aliens may be nothing more than an illusion.
In Price, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wid-
ened the divide between the constitutional protections afforded
permanent resident aliens and those provided to United States
citizens. In holding that the appellant's First Amendment right
to freedom of association was not violated2 by questions on his
naturalization application, which inquired into any and all
associations he may have joined in or outside the United
States at any period of his life,3 the court made a mockery of
the constitutional freedoms allegedly afforded to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'
Specifically, the court applied only limited judicial review
to Mr. Price's First Amendment challenge, instead of the strict
scrutiny that cases involving preferred fundamental rights
1. 962 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1992).
2. Id. at 837.
3. Id. at 838 n.1.
4. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.
v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in part, vacated,
and remanded sub nom., 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1991); American-Arab Anti-Dis-
crimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1992), modifying 940
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1991).
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deserve.5 Citing to Kleindienst v. Mandel, an alien exclusion
case, the Price court required only a "facially legitimate and
bona fide" reason for the executive action, the exclusion of a
foreign national, to pass constitutional muster.7 According to
the majority, this deferential review was justified by the ple-
nary powers and political question doctrines which propose
that the courts refrain from substantive review in areas specif-
ically within the powers of the executive branch, such as for-
eign affairs and political questions.8
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Price is fundamentally
flawed and must be overturned. This Comment will first argue
that sections 1424(a) and 1445 of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act9 are unconstitutional as applied in Price, as the in-
quiries authorized by the attorney general are beyond the
scope of the statutes. Furthermore, these statutes falter on due
process vagueness grounds, as they accord the attorney general
the power of discretionary enforcement and are, therefore, void
on their face.
Second, this Comment will argue that the plenary powers
and political question doctrines, which have traditionally been
employed by courts to avoid scrutinizing constitutional chal-
lenges by resident aliens, are unjustifiable abdications of judi-
cial responsibility as applied to this case. These doctrines.can
no longer be permitted to shield courts from their role as
guardians of the people's liberty.
5. In footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prod, Justice Stone first
spoke of the heightened degree of scrutiny to be applied to First Amendment
rights, as opposed to the lesser degree of protection to be afforded economic rights.
Specifically, he suggested a more exacting judicial scrutiny of legislation that
"appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution such as
those of the first ten amendments." 304 U.S. 144, 151-52 n.4 (1938). Furthermore,
in Palko v. Connecticut, Justice Cardozo also characterized First Amendment rights
as fundamental liberties, in part, because our history, political and legal,
recognizes that freedom of thought and speech are "the indispensable condition, of
nearly every form of freedom." 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). See also Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
6. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
7. Price, 962 F.2d at 842 (quoting Reindienst, 408 U.S. at 769).
8. Id. at 842.
9. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1424, 1445 (Supp. I 1988).
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Third, this Comment will further contend that the limited
standard of judicial review borrowed from the Supreme Court's
decision in Kleindienst ° was erroneously applied to Mr.
Price's First Amendment challenge. Courts have traditionally
held that resident aliens are entitled to the same level of First
Amendment protection as citizens of -the United States."
Thus, the proper standard of review to be applied in the in-
stant case should be the same as that applied to challenges
made by citizens of the United States-strict scrutiny. Specif-
ically, in order for a First Amendment challenge to be denied,
the government must show a substantial relationship between
the information sought and an overriding and compelling gov-
ernment interest.' Applying strict scrutiny to the facts of this
case, this Comment will conclude that Mr. Price's First Amend-
ment challenge should succeed, as the government did not
choose means narrowly tailored enough to further its interest
in screening applicants for citizenship.
Finally, this Comment will focus on future implications of
the decisions denying resident aliens the appropriate level of
constitutional protection. The Ninth Circuit's decision calls into
question the rights allegedly afforded resident aliens. Does this
case signal a change in the attitudes of some courts towards
people not lucky enough to call themselves citizens? Does this
decision mark the beginning of a slippery slope, at the end of
which lies a desert barren of any constitutional freedoms? The
fact that these issues are even in question highlights the grave
error made by the Ninth Circuit in afirming Price.
10. 408 U.S. 753.
11. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953); Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941);
Parcham v. INS, 769 F.2d 1001, 1004 (4th Cir. 1985); Massignani v. INS, 438
F.2d 1276, 1278 (7th Cir. 1971).
12. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546
(1963).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Freedom of Association under the First Amendment
The right to associate freely, which is undisputably afford-
ed to United States citizens, is derived from the constitutional
protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." As
stated by Justice Harlan: "It is beyond debate that freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas
is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech."'4 The right of peaceable assembly was
considered by the framers of the United States Constitution to
lie at the foundation of a government based on the consent of
an informed citizenry-a government dedicated to the estab-
lishment of justice and the preservation of liberty."6 This right
has been considered a priceless means of preserving other
individual liberties as well. 6 Thus, the First Amendment
serves as a limitation on the government's ability to inquire
into the beliefs and associations of its citizens. 7
Courts have long recognized that an individual's freedom
to speak and to petition the government for the redress of
grievances cannot be adequately protected unless a correspond-
ing freedom to participate in group effort toward those ends is
also guaranteed. 8 Without the right to associate, a free soci-
ety cannot exist. What is the use of a right to free speech if
those ideas cannot be spread to others? Associational freedoms
are a necessary means to any meaningful notion of free speech.
Self-government and a democratic stafe, the ideals of the fram-
13. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
14. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460.
15. See Bates, 361 U.S. at 522-23.
16. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
17. See Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
18. See Roberts, 468 U.S. At 622.
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ers of the Constitution, cannot materialize without freedom of
association.
Thus, the highly prized First Amendment right of associa-
tion is considered fundamental and has been accorded a corre-
sponding high level of protection to give it the breathing space
necessary to survive. 9 In keeping with the notion that such
freedom is the foundation of a free society, our courts have not
looked kindly upon state action which infringes upon it. Strict
scrutiny is the standard of review typically employed in deter-
mining whether a .violation of one's associational right has
occurred. Under this standard, if the government is to survive
a First Amendment challenge, it must demonstrate a compel-
ling interest which is pursued by the least restrictive means
necessary to the fulfillment of its objective."0
Included in those activities deemed protected under the
right to associate freely is the right to keep membership lists
to various organizations confidential. For example, in NAACP
v. Alabama,2' the Supreme Court held that the State of Ala-
bama could not constitutionally require the NAACP to produce
records including lists of its members. In holding the state
action to be in violation of the First Amendment, the Court
emphasized that compelled disclosure of one's affiliation with
groups, even those engaged in subversive advocacy, constituted
an effective restraint on freedom of association.22
The Supreme Court has also held that inquiries into
associational activities are an unconstitutional infringement on
First Amendment freedoms. In Baird v. State Bar of Arizo-
na,' the petitioner refused to answer a question on a state
19. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544
(1963).
20. Id. at 546; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
21. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
22. Id. at 462. The issue of membership disclosure was also addressed in
Bates, where the Supreme Court affirmed its decision in NAACP v. Alabama and
found that a municipal ordinance requiring disclosure of membership lists of local
branches of the NAACP was an unconstitutional infringement on the associational
rights of those members. 361 U.S. at 523.
23. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
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bar exam which asked her to state whether she had ever been
a member of the Communist Party or any organization that
advocates the overthrow of the United States government by
force or violence.' On this basis, her application for admis-
sion to the bar was denied.' The Supreme Court concluded
that the First Amendment protected the petitioner from being
subjected to a question which was so potentially fatal to her
associational liberty.26
Thus, courts of this nation are highly protective of citizens'
fundamental right to associate. Even if the state can show a
compelling or legitimate interest, the state still faces the very
heavy burden of proving that the means chosen to effectuate
this goal were closely tailored to its achievement. Means
which are broader than necessary to achieve the end may have
a chilling effect on associational rights. Because of a statute's
broad scope, the challenger may refrain from protected First
Amendment activity in fear that such action will be swept into
the unprotected category. Thus, such a broad statute would
effectively "chill" the challenger's associational rights and, as
such, would be stricken as unconstitutional."
B. The Immigration and Nationality Act
Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the United States Constitu-
tion recognizes that Congress shall have the power "to estab-
lish [a] uniform rule of naturalization."' Pursuant to this au-
thority, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act
(the Act)0 in 1952 and recently amended it in 1990. The Act,
Title Eight of the United States Code, was passed in recogni-
24.. Id. at 4-5.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Xd
27. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546
(1963).
28. Id. at 556.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
30. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1427 (1988).
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tion of the plenary power of the executive branch to either
prohibit or regulate immigration of aliens."'
The legislative history of the Act recognizes that certain
classes of aliens may be denied admission to the United States.
The list of characteristics which may bar an alien from this
country includes physical, mental, and moral defects, member-
ship in certain subversive organizations, and advocacy of cer-
tain subversive doctrines. 2
The Act was amended in 1990, incorporating changes in
political attitudes since the 1950s. As amended, the Act pre-
vents the exclusion of aliens on the basis of their past, current,
or expected beliefs. It further prohibits the exclusion of aliens
on the basis of statements or associations which would be
lawful within the United States, unless it is determined by the
Secretary of State that the admissions would pose a threat to a
United States foreign policy interest."3 Furthermore, it was
the intent of the drafting conference committee that this au-
thority be used sparingly and that it not be invoked merely in
the event an alien might express some disenchantment with
the United States government.' The conference committee
also noted that exclusion on the basis of aliens' beliefs or asso-
ciations could only occur in limited circumstances, such as
where a compelling foreign policy interest was implicated.3 5
In order to be naturalized under the Act, a petitioner must
be a lawfully admitted, permanent resident alien8 who has
resided in the United States for at least five years prior to the
filing of the naturalization petition and has been physically
present for at least half of that time." She must also have
been a person "of good moral character, attached to the princi-
31. H.R. REP. NO. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C-.N. 1653, 1653.
32. Id. at 1703.




36. Immigration Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1952 & Supp. I 1988).
37. Id. § 1427(a)(1)-(2).
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ples of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed
to the good order and happiness of the United States" for five
years before filing the petition and be so up to the time of
admission to citizenship.8
Finally, under one of the sections at issue in Price, section
1424(a)(1), a petitioner may not be a member of any of" the
organizations the statute specifically proscribes. 9 The section
prohibits the naturalization of one "who advocates or teaches,
or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization that
advocates or teaches, opposition to all organized govern-
ment."0 Subsection 2 of this section prohibits the naturaliza-
tion of anyone:
who is a member of or affiliated with (A) the Communist
Party of the United States; (B) any other totalitarian party of
the United States; (C) the Communist Political Association;
(D) the Communist or other totalitarian party of any State of
the United States, of any foreign state, or of any political or
geographical subdivision of any foreign state.'1
38. Id. § 1427(a)(3).
39. Id. § 1424(a)(1).
40. Id.
41. Subsection 2 continues to prohibit affiliation with the following:
(E) any section, subsidiary, branch, affiliate, or subdivision of any
such association or party, (F) the direct predecessors or successors of any
such association or party, regardless of what name such group or organi-
zation may have used, may now bear, or may hereafter adopt; ... un-
less such alien establishes that he did not have knowledge or reason to
believe at the time he became a member of or affiliated with such an
organization (and not thereafter and prior to the date upon which such
organization was so registered or so required to be registered have such
knowledge or reason to believe) that such organization was a Communist-
front organization.
The following subsections prohibit the naturalization of one
(3) who, although not within any of the other provisions of this
section, advocates the economic, international, and governmental doctrines
of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a to-
talitarian dictatorship, or who is. a member of or affiliated with any
organization that advocates the economic, international, and governmental
doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States
of a totalitarian dictatorship, either through its own utterances or
through any written or printed publications issued or published by or
with the permission or consent of or under the authority of such
684 [Vol. XIX:2
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Section 1443(a) of the Act, however, limits the scope of the
attorney general's questioning to:
inquiry concerning the applicant's residence, physical pres-
ence in the United States, good moral character, under-
standing of and attachment to the fundamental principles of
the Constitution of the United States, ability to read, write'
and speak English, and other qualifications to become a nat-
uralized citizen as required by law, and shall be uniform
throughout the United States.42
organization or paid for by the funds of such organization; or
(4) who advocates or teaches or who is a member of or affiliated
with any organization that advocates or teaches (A) the overthrow by
force or violence or other unconstitutional means of the Government of
the United States or of all forms of law; or (B) the duty, necessity, or
propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or offi-
cers... of the Government of the United States or of any other
organized government because of his or their official character, or (C) the
unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property; or (D) sabotage; or
(5) who writes or publishes or causes to be written or published,
or who knowingly circulates, distributes, prints, or displays, or knowingly
causes to be circulated, distributed, printed, published, or displayed, or
who knowingly has in his possession for the purpose of circulation, publi-
cation, distribution, or display, any written or printed matter, advocating
or teaching opposition to all organized government, or advocating (A) the
overthrow by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means of the Gov-
ernment of the United States or of all forms of law; or (B) the duty,
necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer
or officers... of the Government of the United States or of any other
organized government because of his or their official character, or (C) the
unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property; 'or (D) sabotage; or
(E) the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world
communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitariad
dictatorship; or
(6) who is a member of or affiliated with any organization that
writes, circulates, distributes, prints, publishes, or displays, or causes to
be written, circulated, distributed, printed, published, or displayed, or
that has in its possession for the purpose of circulation, distribution,
publication, issue, or display, any written or printed matter of the char-
acter described in subparagraph (5).
Id. §§ 1424(aX2)-(6).
42. Id. § 1443(a).
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In furtherance of the objective of obtaining information,
the attorney general may designate Immigration and Natural-
ization Service (INS) employees to take testimony concerning
any matter touching, or in any way affecting the admissibility
of a petitioner for naturalization.' In addition, section
1445(a) permits the attorney general to make inquiries on a
naturalization application which in her opinion may be materi-
al to naturalization and which are required to be proved unider
the Act.4 Thus, the attorney general may make the inquiries
necessary to fulfill the statutory requirements for naturaliza-
tion.
C. Constitutional Protections Historically Afforded Resident
Aliens
While First Amendment protections have not been extend-
ed to those nonresident aliens seeking to enter the United
States,45 courts have consistently held that resident aliens are
entitled to its protections."6 However, the extent of First
Amendment protection afforded to lawful resident aliens is an
issue which has been extensively debateil by the courts.
The examination of this issue began in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States,,4 in which the Supreme Court upheld the de-
portation of three Chinese laborers, lawfully admitted to the
United States as resident aliens, based on their failure to ob-
tain certificates of residence from Internal Revenue collectors,
as required by an 1892 law. 8 In its decision, the Court de-
clared that the power to exclude and deport aliens flows from
the inherent power of a sovereign nation to conduct interna-
tional relations. 9 The Court explained that power over aliens
43. Id. § 1446(b).
44. Id. § 1445(a).
45. United States ex. rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
46. See supra note 11.
47. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
48. Id. at 699-703, 729.
49. Id. at 704-07, 711-13.
686 [Vol. XIX:-2
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is vested in the political branches of the government which
may exercise this power in an absolute, unqualified manner.' °
Although the Court admitted that Congress's activities were
subject to constitutional limitations and, thus, judicial review,
the Court failed to significantly scrutinize the 1892 statute."'
However, three dissenters contested the majority's deferen-
tial approach.52 Justice Brewer noted that despite the
majority's holding, the Constitution does not accord Congress
uncircumscribed power over deportation.53 He also recognized
that many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights do not dis-
tinguish between citizens and other persons and, thus, con-
cluded that these provisions apply to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
The deferential standard of review conceived by the Fong
Yue Ting majority was affirmed forty years later in Bridges v.
Wixon."5 There, the Court considered a resident alien's First
Amendment challenge to a statute providing for the deporta-
tion of aliens who were members of, or affiliated with, any
organization believing in the forceful overthrow of the United
States.58 The majority concluded that Mr. Bridges' conduct
and speech did not rise to the level of that proscribed by the
statute, reasoning that the statute was not intended to equate
affiliation with casual or innocent association.57 Thus, while it
acknowledged that First Amendment rights were afforded
resident aliens, the Court declined to explore the level of First
Amendment protection that should be afforded these aliens
50. Id. at 705-07.
51. Id. at 711 ([T]he question now before the court is whether... Congress
has exercised this right.., consistent with the Constitution.); id. at 713 (aMhe
power to exclude or to expel aliens ... is to be regulated by treaty or by act of
Congress ... [subject to intervention by] the judicial department .. .).
52. See id. at 732, 734 (Brewer, J., dissenting). Justices Brewer, Fuller, and
Field dissented, see id. at 732-62.
53. Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting). Justices Field and Fuller expressed
similar views. Id. at 749 (Fuller, J., dissenting); id. at 762 (Field, C.J., dissenting).
55. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
56. Id. at 138.
57. Id. at 142-43, 147-49.
1993]
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and, instead, chose to proceed on safer statutory interpretation
grounds.
The concurring opinion, however, written by Justice Mur-
phy, exhibited a firm commitment to the protection of the free-
doms of speech and association for resident aliens. 8 He dis-
tinguished between resident aliens lawfully within the bound-
aries of the United States and those seeking entrance, noting
that "once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country
he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution to all people within our borders.""s According to Justice
Murphy, the rights afforded resident aliens include those guar-
anteed by the First and Fifth Amendments and the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' ° This conclusion
rested on the absence of distinction between citizens and resi-
dent aliens in the text of these amendments."' Thus, he con-
cluded that these amendments extend their privileges to all
persons, regardless of nationality, and "guard against infringe-
ment on those rights by federal or state authority."2 Perhaps
most importantly, Justice Murphy further concluded that the
plenary power of Congress in the area of immigration and
naturalization should not be permitted to eclipse the rights
protected by the Bill of Rights, as any other action would leave
the protections of the Constitution applicable to only a select
few."
A decade later in Johnson v. Eisentrager," the Court ex-
pressed views similar to those of Justice Murphy in Bridges.
Despite the Court's determination that German nationals,
convicted of having engaged in military activity in China after
58. Id. at 160 (Murphy, J., concurring).




63. Id. In conclusion, Justice Murphy looked to the future ramifications of
decisions involving the protections of resident aliens: "Our concern in this case
does not halt with the fate of Henry Bridges .... The liberties of 3,500,000 other
aliens in this nation are also at stake .... The Bill of Rights belongs to them as
well as to all citizens." Id. at 165-66 (Murphy, J., concurring).
64. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
688 [Vol. XIX:2
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the surrender of Germany, had no right to a writ of habeas
corpus to test the legality of their detention, the Court never-
theless recognized that resident aliens are afforded an ascend-
ing scale of rights which increase with the alien's commitment
to this country.65
In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,66 decided less than a de-
cade after Bridges, the Court reaffirmed Congress's inherent,
plenary authority to expel and deport resident aliens and re-
jected the petitioners' arguments that the First Amendment
prevented their deportation for membership in the Communist
Party.6 7 However, what is significant about the majority opin-
ion is not so much its conclusion, but the reasoning behind it.
The Court determined that under the prevailing First Amend-
ment standard, the clear and present danger test," the
petitioners' speech and conduct could be proscribed; therefore,
their deportations were consistent with the First Amend-
ment.69 Thus, while the Court did deport the aliens, which
seems consistent with the Fong Yue Ting line of cases, the
Court strayed from this precedent in one significant way. The
Court applied the same standard used to judge the First
Amendment activities of citizens to resident aliens and, thus,
signaled a slight transition toward an expansion of the liber-
ties afforded resident aliens.
However, according to the dissent, the majority's applica-
tion of the clear and present danger test was not enough to
bring this deportation within the realm of constitutionality.
65. The Court stated the following:
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable,
has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he in-
creases his identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in this coun-
try creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain
rights; they become more extensive and secure when he makes a prelimi-
nary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and they expand to
those of full citizenship upon naturalization.
Id. at 770-71.
66. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
67. Id. at 592.
68. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
69. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592.
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Justices Black and Douglas reiterated the well settled principle
that resident aliens are persons within the meaning of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and are provided the
protections of the First Amendment.0 Noting that Congress's
power to exclude, admit, or deport aliens is implied in the
Constitution and that the right to life and liberty is expressly
provided, Justices Douglas and Black questioned why implied
powers were given priority over express rights. 1
Justice Black had .another opportunity to dissent on this
issue in Carlson v. Landon." Here, the majority denied the
writ of habeas corpus sought by four resident aliens arrested
under the Internal Securities Act for being members of the
Communist Party.73 Blind to any First Amendment violation,
the Court reasoned that as long as aliens fail to become natu-
ralized, Congress's plenary power over immigration and natu-
ralization permits their expulsion. 4 In his dissent, Justice
Black spoke poignantly of the importance of the First Amend-
ment, reasoning that freedom of speech is necessary for all or
may eventually be available for none. However, Justice
Black's beliefs had not yet been reflected in a majority opinion.
The struggle to determine what level of First Amendment
protections should be afforded resident aliens continued in
Kleindienst v. Mandel.76 Kleindienst was decided in 1972 and
to date is the last Supreme Court case to address the First
Amendment rights of aliens. The case involved a Belgian citi-
zen and scholar who sought a visa to enter the United States
and speak at a university on the topic of Marxist political theo-
70. Id. at 598-99 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting). See also Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
146 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Parcham v. INS, 769 F.2d
1001, 1004-05 (4th Cir. 1985); Massignani v. INS, 438 F.2d 1276, 1278 (7th Cir.
1971).
71. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 579-80 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
72. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 534.
75. Id. at 555 (Black, J., dissenting).
76. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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ry." The attorney general denied his visa on the grounds that
Mr. Mandel advocated the doctrines of world communism and
had violated the terms of previous' visas he had been
granted."8 Mr. Mandel and the United States citizens who had
invited him to speak brought a lawsuit to enjoin the attorney
general from denying Mr. Mandel's entry. They claimed that
the denial of his visa was a violation of the citizens' First
Amendment rights to hear, speak, and debate with Mr. Mandel
in person and otherwise receive information. 9
As a preliminary matter, the Court held that since Mr.
Mandel was a nonresident alien seeking entry into the United
States, he was not entitled to the protections of the Constitu-
tion.o With regard to the citizens' challenge, the Court con-
cluded that the fact that First Amendment rights were impli-
cated did not render its decision dispositive.8' Rather, the
Court once again pulled the plenary powers doctrine out of the
closet, dusted it off, and used it to justify a lower First Amend-
ment standard in this case because the admission of aliens was
at issue. The Court held that:
[Wihen the Executive exercises this power negatively on the
basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts
will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor
test it by balancing its justification against the First Amend-
ment interests of those who seek personal communication
with the applicant. 2
This standard of limited judicial review, under which only
a bona fide and facially legitimate reason is sufficient to justify
an infringement on First Amendment rights, was highly criti-
cized by Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan in their re-
spective dissents." They questioned the judicial basis and the
77. Id.
78. Id. at 756-59.
79. Id. at 760.
80. Id. at 762.
81. Id. at 765.
82. Id. at 770. In addition, the Court cited no case law to support this novel
standard.
83. Id. at 770 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 774 (Marshall & Brennan; JJ.,
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origins of the low "facially legitimate and bona fide reason"
standard employed by the majority."M
Additionally, the dissenters disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of the plenary powers doctrine. While conceding
Congress's broad powers in the area of immigration and natu-
ralization, the dissenting justices emphasized that deference to
the legislative or the executive branches could not be tolerated
when individual freedoms were at stake."s
More recently, in 1989 in American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. Meese (American-Arab)," a federal
district court followed the rationale of the Kleindienst dissents
and provided resident aliens with the same level of First
Amendment protection guaranteed to United States citizens. 7
In American-Arab, the INS commenced deportation proceed-
ings against members of an organization advocating the eco-
nomic doctrines of world communism." The court dismissed
the deportation actions and held that "aliens who are legally
within the United States are protected by the First Amend-
ment and that their First Amendment rights are not limited by
the government's plenary immigration power."89
The court based its holding on several principles which
have been long recognized in cases involving resident aliens'
constitutional challenges: first, aliens within the United States
should enjoy the protections of the First Amendment of* the
Constitution;' and second, the plenary power of Congress to
dissenting).
84. Justices Brennan and Marshall attacked the standard applied by the ma-
jority- "It is established constitutional doctrine, after all, that government may
restrict First Amendment rights only if the restriction is necessary to further a
compelling governmental interest." Id. at 777. They also questioned the judicial
basis for the standard. Id. at 782.
85. Id.
86. 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
87. Id. at 1082.
88. Id. at 1063.
89. Id. at 1084.
90. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953); United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 1988); Parcham v. INS,




expel aliens must be exercised consistently with the Constitu-
tion.9' The court gleaned the latter principle from the Su-
preme Court's analysis in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy.2 As
mentioned earlier,9 s although the Court in Harisiades found
that the First Amendment did not prevent the resident alien's
deportation, it applied the same First Amendment standard to
aliens' claims as to United States citizens' First Amendment
challenges-namely, the clear and present danger test. The
American-Arab court apparently read this case as a mandate
to apply the same First Amendment standard to resident
aliens as to United States citizens. In applying this standard,
the court found that the deportation proceedings violated the
First Amendment rights of the petitioners.95 Thus, the
American-Arab court acknowledged not only that resident
aliens are protected by the First Amendment, but also that
they are entitled to the same level of First Amendment protec-
tion as United States citizens, despite the plenary powers of
Congress.
Two guiding principles emerge from this voluminous case
law. First, while the power of Congress has been characterized
as plenary in the area of immigration and naturalization, this
implied power is subject to judicial review under the "para-
mount law of the Constitution."96 Second, resident aliens are
entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights, including those
guaranteed by the First Amendment.97 However, the level of
judicial scrutiny that should be applied to a resident alien's
91. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060,
1075 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
92. 342 U.S. 580 (1952). See also supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
94. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1077.
95. The American-Arab court used the contemporary First Amendment formula
of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), in coming to their conclusion. 714 F.
Supp. at 1082 n.18. The Brandenburg Court held that consistent with the First
Amendment, the government may only prohibit advocacy "directed to inciting or
prohibiting imminent lawless action... and likely to produce such lawless ac-
tion." 395 U.S. at 447.
96. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952).
97. See supra note 11.
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First Amendment challenge is ambiguous in light of the combi-
nation of these two principles. As the law stands today, courts
have used the plenary powers doctrine as a means of excusing
themselves from any meaningful review of the alien's challeng-
es where the First Amendment is at issue, despite the prin-
ciple that the plenary powers doctrine.has no place in challeng-
es to fundamental rights.
D. Price v. INS: Facts and Procedure
John Eric Price, a citizen of the United Kingdom, was
granted resident alien status in 1960.98 Since then he has
worked and resided in the United States.' Twenty-four years
later, on April 24, 1984, Mr. Price petitioned for naturaliza-
tion.00 On his application, he responded in the negative to
question 19 which asked whether he was or had ever been a
member of, or associated with, the Communist Party, had ever
knowingly aided or supported'it, or had ever advocated, taught,
believed in, or knowingly supported or furthered the interests
of communism.'' Additionally, during the course of a prelim-
inary examination Mr. Price swore:
I am not and have not been, within the meaning of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, for a period of at least 10 years
immediately preceding the date of this petition, a member of
or affiliated with any organization proscribed by such Act, or
any section, subsidiary, branch, affiliate or subdivision there-
of, nor have I during such period believed in, advocated, en-
gaged in, or performed any of the acts or activities prohibited
by such Act."°
He refused, however, to answer question 1803 of the applica-





103. Among the questions Mr. Price refused to answer were:
Are you now, or have you ever been, a member, or are you now
affiliated, or have you ever been affiliated with any organization, associa-
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tion on the grounds that it was too broad and violated his con-
stitutional rights, specifically that this question chilled his
First Amendment right to freedom of association.' 4 Question
18 reads: "List your present and past membership in or affil-
iation with every organization, association, fund, foundation,
party, club, society or similar group in the United States or in
any other country or place, and your foreign military ser-
vice.""5 In the space provided for an answer to this question,
Mr. Price wrote, "Please see attached statement." The state-
ment was a detailed argument contending that question 18
violated his First Amendment right of association. °6
Mr. Price was given a copy of section 313 of the Act,107
which describes prohibited organizations and activities, partici-
pation in which will bar an alien from being naturalized. After
reviewing this section, he swore that he was not and had never
been a member of or affiliated with any organization men-
tioned in that section and reaffirmed the averment he made at
the first preliminary examination."8
On the basis of his refusal to answer question 18, the
district court denied Mr. Price's petition for naturalization as
tion, fund, foundation, party, club, society or similar group in the United
States or in any other country or place?
Are you now or have you ever been in the United States, a mem-
ber of any organization in the United States?
Have you ever been a member of any organizations outside the
United States?
Have you ever been a member of a political organization in the
United States?
Were you ever a member, outside the United States, of any orga-
nization that... is or was political?
Are you now or have you ever been a member of any association,
fund, foundation, party, club, society or any similar groups?
Have you ever been affiliated with any organization, political or
nonpolitical, in the United States?
Id. at 838 n.1.
104. Id. at 838.
105. Id. at 837.
106. Id. at 837-38.
107. See supra note 33.
108. Price, 962 F.2d at 838-39.
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recommended by the INS. 9 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affired."1 Mr. Price was then granted a
rehearing, in which the court affirmed its prior decision."'
First, the court noted that Congress's power in the area of im-
migration and naturalization is plenary."' Second, the court
stressed that the power to admit or expel aliens is a "funda-
mental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's
political departments largely immune from judicial con-
trol.""' Thus, the majority concluded that the same "reasons
that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate
a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress
or the President in the area of immigration and naturaliza-
tion."
1 4
With the support of the plenary powers and political ques-
tion doctrines, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
limited judicial scrutiny standard set forth in Kleindienst v.
Mandel,"' which required only a facially legitimate and bona
fide reason to justify encroachments on First Amendment free-
doms." 6 The court held that question 18 was appropriate be-
cause the right to naturalize is not one possessed by aliens
"unless all statutory requirements are complied with.""' The
court continued:
Because a petitioner might be mistaken about whether an
organization is of the type prohibited by section 1424(a) and
because Question 18 could reasonably reveal information
109. Id. at 839.
110. Price v. INS, 941 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
111. Price, 962 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1992).
112. Id. at 841.
113. Id. at 841 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 796 (1977)).
114. Id.
115. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). In Kleindienst, the Supreme Court held that when
the Executive exercises this "power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate
and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that dis-
cretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment
interests ... ." Id. at 770.
116. Id.




relevant to other requirements for naturalization, the Attor-
ney General's decision that Question 18 is relevant to deter-
mining qualification for naturalization is facially legitimate
and bona fide."8
In his dissent, Judge Noonan criticized the majority's use
of the Kleindienst standard."9 While he agreed that the pow-
er of Congress to set standards for naturalization is broad, he
emphasized that it must fall within the parameters of the
Constitution.2 He also noted the critical factual distinctions
between the two cases, namely that Mr. Mandel was seeking to
enter the United States, while Mr. Price was a permanent resi-
dent alien who has "imbibed the air of freedom which perme-
ates our culture.""2 Judge Noonan applied the traditional
First Amendment analysis, strict scrutiny, to Mr. Price's chal-
lenge and found the attorney general's inquiry to be uncon-
stitutional. He suggested that as construed by the majority,
the statute authorizing such questioning permits the INS to
probe further than warranted by any governmental inter-
est.' According to Judge Noonan, a narrowly tailored ques-
tion could be asked of the petitioner without infringing on his
First Amendment rights." However, since question 18 was
not limited to specific association and was not directly respon-
sive, it was not constitutionally permissible.' Thus, Judge
Noonan found that the statute was unconstitutional, as it was
without a rational purpose and infringed severely on the right
to free association."
118. Price, 962 F.2d at 843-44.
119. Id. at 844 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 844-45.
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IH. ANALYSIS
A Misapplication of 8 U.S.C. Sections 1424(a) and 1445(a)
1. The Statutory Scope of Sections 1424(a) and 1445(a)
Question 18's sweeping inquiry into any and all associa-
tions joined by Mr. Price at any time and in any country is an
impermissibly broad application of the government's authority
under the Act. The government is authorized by section
1424(a) of the Act to inquire into any and all subversive or
communist groups in which the petitioner may have been a
member or with which the petitioner may have been affiliat-
ed. 6 In pursuit of this information, Mr. Price was asked
question 19 which inquired into whether he had ever been a
member of, or associated with, the Communist Party, had ever
knowingly aided or supported it, or had ever "advocated,
taught, believed in, or knowingly supported or furthered the
interests of Communism. " '27 Mr. Price answered all parts of
this question in the negative." Furthermore, he swore twice
that he had never been a member of or associated with any
such groups.29 Thus, the government's interest regarding im-
migration and naturalization was satisfied by the inquiries of
question 19.
While question 19 is within the limits of the scope of. the
attorney general's permissible inquiry under section 1424(a),
the inquiry authorized by question 18 transcends the bound-
aries of the attorney general's authority, as its open-ended
inquiry touches topics well beyond the scope of the statute.180
First, the contention that the attorney general has limited
power to screen applicants is supported by the language of
section 1424. Section 1424 lists specific groups and ideologies
126. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
127. Price, 962 F.2d at 838.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 107-08.
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with which association will preclude naturalization. 1' As Mr.
Price contended, however, the section 1424(a) list is inclusive
and prohibits the attorney general from denying naturalization
on the basis of association with any organization other than
those enumerated in the statute.
13 2
Therefore, it seems logical that the inquiries made by the
attorney general in pursuit of naturalization must be limited to
requiring petitioner to list groups that are proscribed under
section 1424(a). To that end, Mr. Price swore under oath that
he was not a member of any of the organizations proscribed by
section 1424(a) and responded negatively to all inquiries con-
cerning membership in any communist group or any organi-
zation advocating the violent overthr6w of government.
133
The probing inquiry of question 18 does not conform to these
limits, as it does not inquire only into Mr. Price's membership
in the specific organizations listed in section 1424(a). This
question represents a complete disregard for statutory guide-
lines, and, thus, it must be struck.
Second, the government does not have a legitimate inter-
est in any organization that Mr. Price has ever joined, inside
or outside the United States. Question 18 inquires not only
into associations with political groups but also social organiza-
tions, groups that advocate a specific sexual preference, asso-
ciations that disagree with current government policy, and
others in which the government has no business. This inquiry
is reminiscent of the Red Scare and seems to be closer to a
witchhunt than to a legitimate inquiry by the United States
government to determine the qualifications of its citizens. This
question is underhanded censorship and, as such, is invalid. As
stated by Justice Douglas- in his Kleindienst dissent,
"[Tihought control is not within the competence of any branch
of... government... [and] the Congress did not undertake to
131. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
132. Price, 962 F.2d at 840. The court refuted Mr. Price's assumption on the
basis that there was no legislative history to support his contention. Id.
133. Id at 838-39.
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make the attorney general a censor.""3 First Amendment
freedoms are protected not only from blatant and obvious gov-
ernment encroachment but also from the stifling effects of
more subtle interference,. such as the inquiry of question
18."' Thus, question 18 must be struck, as its inquiry
stretches beyond any legitimate government interest.
The Price court seeks to .justify the sweeping inquiry of
question 18 by relying upon section 1445 of the Act which
authorizes the attorney general to require the applicant for
naturalization to aver "all facts which in the opinion of the
attorney general may be material to the applicant's natural-
ization, and required to be proved under this subchapter.""'
However, the attorney general's discretionary power must still
meet minimum constitutional standards.
The language of section 1445 does not suggest that the
authority of the attorney general in screening applicants for
naturalization is limitless. Rather, it states that any inquiry
made by the attorney general must be "material" to the peti-
tion for naturalization.8 ' Questions concerning Mr. Price's
affiliation with communist organizations or other organizations
which advocate the violent overthrow of government may be
relevant to his petition, as such subversive activity could be
deemed material to the determination of Mr. Price's natural-
ization.
However, the inquiry authorized by question 18 is far from
material. It does not focus on subversive groups, or those
groups which advocate the violent overthrow of government or
the achievement of a Communist state. Rather than focusing
on material associations, it is a fishing expedition without
rational purpose. In requiring petitioner to list all his associa-
tions regardless of their relevance to the application, the attor-
ney general exceeded the scope of his authority under both sec-
tions 1424(a) and 1445 of the Act.
134. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 772 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
135. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).




Thus, contrary to the court's conclusion, neither of these
sections accord the attorney general the power to ask question
18. The scope of both sections 1424 and 1445 extends only to
inquiries regarding membership in the organizations listed in
section 1424(a).
2. Due Process
The reasoning offered by the Price court to justify the
broad scope of question 18 falters on due process grounds of
notice. In allowing the attorney general to determine which
organizations are proscribed by section 1424(a), the court ig-
nores the concept of notice as required by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.
As a preliminary matter, resident aliens are afforded the
protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Since resident aliens are "persons," they
are entitled to the same protections of the Due Process Clause
as citizens receive."' Thus, Mr. Price should be protected by
the guarantees of the Due Process Clause:
Concepts of notice have been at the core of the Due Pro-
cess Clause from the time of the birth of our nation. When a
government agency or a court considers terminating or impair-
ing an individual's constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or
property interest, notice must be given to the individual whose
interest is at stake."9 Due process requires that statutory
language convey a "sufficiently definite warning as to the pro-
scribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices."14
0
In the context of the First Amendment, this "notice" re-
quirement is manifested in the "void for vagueness" doctrine.
In order to prevent a chilling of the exercise of preferred or
fundamental constitutional rights such as freedoms of speech,
138. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
139. JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTTUTIONAL LAW § 13.8, 529-30 (4th ed.
1991).
140. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951).
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assembly, and association, this doctrine requires strict scrutiny
in judicial review of laws touching upon these valued liber-
ties.14'
To the extent that a law is vague and relates to a pre-
ferred right, it has, as one consequence, the ability to deter or
chill persons from engaging in constitutionally protected
speech or activity. This "chilling effect" is a consequence of
statutes which do not adequately provide members of a com-
munity with notice of what conduct is protected by the First
Amendment. Without proper notice, community members will
censor their own behavior and forego constitutionally protected
behavior in fear that it will be considered impermissible by the
vague statute. Thus, as a direct consequence of the
legislature's imprecise drafting, protected First Amendment
activities are chilled. Therefore, a heightened degree of judicial
scrutiny should be accorded to statutes implicating fundamen-
tal rights in order to guard against a chilling effect.
Aside from the deterrence of the chilling effect, the void-
for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the necessity for clear
guidelines to govern law enforcement. Without such standards,
officials are given too much discretion to enforce statutes on a
selective basis.' For example, in Kolender v. Lawson, Jus-
tice O'Connor struck a statute on vagueness grounds .and
stressed that the most important aspect of the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine is the imposition of guidelines which prohibit
arbitrary, selective enforcement of statutes in a constitutional-
ly suspect manner.'"
As a result of the chilling effect and discretionary enforce-
ment concerns, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires the
invalidation of statutes which infringe upon speech in terms
141. NOWAK, supra note 139, § 16.9, at 950-51.
142. NOWAK, supra note 139, § 16.9, at 950.
143. NOWAK, supra note 139, § 16.9, at 950. See also City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Publishing Co., noting that "without standards governing the exercise
of discretion, a government official may decide who may speak and who may not
based upon the content of the speech or viewpoint of the speaker." 486 U.S. 750,
763 (1988).
144. 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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that are so vague as to either prohibit protected speech or
leave an individual without clear guidelines as to the nature of
the punishable speech.'45
In Price, the government argued that the INS must deter-
mine whether particular organizations are of the prohibited
type, since the petitioner may wrongly believe that an orga-
nization with which he is affiliated does not fall within section
1424(a):
A petitioner who does not know he is a member of a commu-
nist-front organization would not list that organization in
responding to questions regarding 1424(a) type organiza-
tions... only by examining all organizations with which the
petitioner is affiliated can the attorney general determine
whether the petitioner had "reason to believe" the organiza-
tion is or was a Communist-front. 6
The court of appeals agreed with the INS, stating that "[it
is completely reasonable to assume that knowing the organiza-
tions with which petitioner is associated will be relevant to one
or more of the requirements for citizenship."'47 However, al-
lowing the attorney general to make an ad hoc determination
of whether a group falls within those proscribed by the statute
permits an unconstitutionally broad delegation of powers to the
attorney general which clashes with fundamental notions of
due process.
The Ninth Circuit's construction of sections 1424 and 1445
has two fatal due process flaws. First, it does not provide no-
tice to resident aliens about which groups are proscribed, as it
does not limit the attorney general's inquiry to those groups
listed in section 1424 or to those that may be material to its
investigation. Rather, the government's inquiry is limited only
by the discretion of the attorney general. Second, it permits
arbitrary and capricious decision making by the attorney gen-
145. NOWA, supra note 139, § 16.9, at 847.
146. Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1992).
147. Id.
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eral, as there are no standards to guide his or her decision
making.
For example, suppose Mr. Price answered question 18 and
admitted to membership in the "Betty Crocker Cooking Group"
which the attorney general decided was a front for a Commu-
nist government organization and on this basis denied Mr.
Price's petition for naturalization.
In this hypothetical, Mr. Price was not put on notice that
membership in the Betty Crocker Cooking Group would bar
naturalization, because, as set forth by the Price court, it is the
attorney general who will decide if a specific group is one
which falls within section 1424(a).'" Under the Ninth
Circuit's formula, an alien may have no idea that he is a mem-
ber of a group that will prevent naturalization until the attor-
ney general says so, at which point such information is useless.
Thus, the lack of notice implicates the concerns of the chilling
effect doctrine. Mr. Price's freedom of association is chilled be-
cause he cannot become a member of any group or organiza-
tion with confidence that such affiliation will not preclude
naturalization. The statutory vagueness of section 1424 unjus-
tifiably chills his associational freedoms and, in turn, violates
his due process rights.
In addition, the above Betty Crocker Cooking Group exam-
ple reveals the problem of discretionary enforcement. The at-
torney general's subjective determination of whether a group
or organization falls within those prohibited by section 1424(a)
is precisely the type of decision making frowned upon by the
Supreme Court.49 Too much discretion by a government
agency leads to censorship, as an overbroad grant of authority
"contains an obvious invitation to discriminatory enforce-
ment."' The system advocated by the Price court allows the
attorney general to make the determination of whether mem-
148. Id. See also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
149. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988);
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611 (1971); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
150. Coates, 402 U.S. at 616.
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bership in a group such as Betty Crocker may preclude natu-
ralization on the basis of his or her own subjective feelings, not
on the basis of legally recognized, objective standards.
In the absence of structured standards, this statute must
be struck as facially invalid 5' because courts have always re-
quired stringent guidelines when government officials are
making decisions concerning First Amendment rights.'52 Mr.
Price's case can be no different. The power of Congress to lay
down the law in the area of immigration and naturalization,
while considered plenary by most courts, does not include a
concomitant power to be arbitrary.'53 Our system of checks
and balances calls upon the judiciary to ensure that unfettered
official discretion is not permitted to invade the areas of con-
stitutional freedoms, even by direction of Congress.' The
Ninth Circuit's construction of sections 1424 and 1445 confers
impermissibly broad authority on the attorney general. Some
check on the attorney general's authority must be employed so
that future abuses of discretion do not occur. Sections 1424
and 1445, narrowly interpreted, contain the necessary stan-
dards. Section 1424 provides a list of those associations that
may preclude naturalization, 55 and section 1445 emphasizes
that any inquiry made by the attorney general must be mate-
rial to naturalization.55 However, the Ninth Circuit's present
broad construction of these statutes, allowing for an
open-ended inquiry into all of Mr. Price's associational activi-
ties, violates his due process rights.
151. Id. See also Lakewood, 486 U.S. 750; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,
56 (1985). These cases stand for the proposition that when a statute permits ex-
cessive administrative discretion, a facial challenge is appropriate. Without proper
standards, the statute in question will be stricken. See Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 763.
152. See Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-95 (1951); Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451 (1987).
153. Phillip Monrad, Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power and the PLO, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 831, 860 n.145 (1989) [hereinafter Ideological Exclusion] (quoting Henry
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exer-
cise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1390 (1953)).
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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In conclusion, the Price court's applications of sections
1424(a) and 1445(a) are unauthorized by the statute and un-
constitutional. First, question 18's sweeping inquiry into any
and all associations joined by Mr. Price at any time and in any
country is an impermissibly broad application of the
government's authority under the Act. Second, the attorney
general's ad hoc determination of which group memberships
may preclude naturalization amounts to a due process viola-
tion on grounds of lack of notice and vagueness.
B. The Plenary Powers and Political Question Doctrines
United States courts have consistently used the plenary
powers and political question doctrines to justify their restraint
from scrutinizing the constitutional claims of resident aliens,
thereby denying them their basic constitutional rights."5 7
The Price court also used the political question doctrine to
justify its decision not to apply traditional strict scrutiny anal-
ysis to First Amendment claims. This doctrine espouses that
certain matters, which are political in nature, are best resolved
by the "body politic" rather than by judicial review. '58 The
most important consequence of the political question doctrine
is that it renders the government action in question immune
from judicial review.'59 The Ninth Circuit Court reasoned
that because the functions of the INS implicate questions of
foreign relations and touch upon political issues, deference
should be given to its decisions."6
Additionally, the Price court justified its deferential stan-
dard of judicial review with the plenary powers doctrine. This
doctrine rests on the following principle: "Over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than
it is over the admission of aliens. Our cases have long recog-
nized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
157. See Ideological Exclusion, supra note 153, at 848-61.
158. NOWAK, supra note 139, § 2.15, at 102.
159. NOWAK, supra note 139, § 2.15, at 102.
160. Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 1992) (relying on INS v. Abudu,
485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
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sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political de-
partments largely immune from judicial control." 6' Since
power over immigration is inherent in sovereignty, Congress's
power is plenary in this area, and the judiciary must defer to
its decisions in this field.
62
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on these doctrines to justify
limited judicial review in areas of fundamental freedoms is
misplaced. First, while Congress and the executive branch do
have explicitly granted power over foreign relations, and ques-
tions implicating the exercise of those powers may be deemed
political and, thus, nonjusticiable by the courts, these issues
are not raised in Price. If the political question doctrine is in-
voked, a court must abstain completely from review on. the
merits." However, the court did not abstain in this case,
rather it used the political question theory to support limited
judicial review, stating that the policies that preclude judicial
review of political questions also support a limited standard of
judicial review of decisions implicating immigration and natu-
ralization."' This middle level of scrutiny completely defies
the political question doctrine which demands that courts re-
frain completely from review on the merits. The notion of sepa-
ration of powers cannot be tossed aside with such ease. If, as
the Ninth Circuit suggests, this challenge implicates the politi-
cal question doctrine, the court had no place reviewing Mr.
Price's challenge.
The majority continued by saying that the Kleindienst
standard of limited review was appropriate because the natu-
ralization process implicates the political conduct of govern-
ment." Such judicial deference, however, has no place in the
context of First Amendment challenges which in no way in-
volve political questions.
161. Price, 962 F.2d at 841 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 796
(1977)).
162. Ideological Exclusion, supra note 153, at 857.
163. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
164. Price, 962 F.2d at 841.
165. Id. at 842.
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As mentioned earlier in this section, issues of foreign rela-
tions which would normally trigger the political question doc-
trine are not present in this case. Mr. Price's citizenship ap-
plication does not fall within one of the categories enunciated
by the Supreme Court which will preclude judicial review.' 6
While it has been argued that the area of immigration and
naturalization may fall within a political question category,
namely a "textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department,"' this is not conclusive up-
on the judiciary. The Supreme Court has stated that the ap-
pearance of political overtones within issues implicating consti-
tutional violations does not mechanically invoke the political
question doctrine." The Court reasoned:
[If this turns the question into a political question, virtually
every challenge to the constitutionality of a statute would be
a political question .... No policy underlying the political
question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive...
can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision
for the courts.'69
Thus, while this First Amendment challenge does arise in the
context of immigration and naturalization, this is not, in itself,
a justification for limited judicial review.
166. In Baker, the Court enumerated reasons for finding an issue to be
nonjusticiable as a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion.
369 U.S. at 217.
167. Id.
168. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 921 (1983).
169. Id. at 941-42.
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Furthermore, concerns about institutional competence of
the courts to deal with issues of foreign relations do not sur-
face in this case. While immigration is one issue, the dominant
theme presented in Price is one of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, an area in which the courts of this country, not the
executive branch or Congress, are skilled. In his Kleindienst
dissent, Justice Marshall emphasized that judicial deference to
the executive branch in the face of governmental overreaching
is tantamount to an abandonment of the courts' role as
guardians of individual liberty. He concluded that the notion of
judicial deference, based on the premise that political branches
of government cannot be hindered by the courts in making
foreign policy decisions, has no place in cases involving First
Amendment rights."
In further seeking to justify the application of the Su-
preme Court's Kleindienst facially legitimate and bona .fide
reason standard, one of limited judicial review, to Mr. Price's
First Amendment challenge, the Price court also invoked the
plenary powers doctrine.
In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,"7 Justice Frankfuirter de-
scribed the plenary powers doctrine as resting on the premise
that the conditions for entry of every alien are concerns of
Congress, wholly outside those of our courts." Several ratio-
nale have been advanced to support this doctrine. Most notable
is the theory that the powers of Congress and the executive
branch over immigration are "inherent in sovereignty.""73
While congressional powers over immigration may, in fact,
be inherent, there is no justification for the blatant refusal of
courts to safeguard the liberties guaranteed to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Fur-
thermore, the notion that the federal government need not
170. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 785 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
172. Id. at 596-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
173. The Court first used this phrase in Nishimura v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892). This rationale has been used in modern cases as well. See
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765.
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follow the letter of the Constitution in its treatment of aliens is
based upon a warped and restrictive view of the Constitution's
scope and purpose.174 If this country's judicial system is to
remain the champion of individual liberties it was intended to
be, it must not allow principles of judicial restraint to eclipse
its primary role as a guardian of freedom and liberty. This
infectious judicial trend which sacrifices individual liberty to
notions of plenary power and -political questions must not be
allowed to continue.
Additionally, it is well settled that when a claim is made
that a particular legislative inquiry infringes substantially
upon First Amendment associational rights of individuals, the
courts must fulfill their constitutional mandate and review the
challenged actions on their merits. 7 ' Moreover, when
Congress's exercise of one of its enumerated powers clashes
with the Bill of Rights, it is the judiciary that must undertake
the delicate and difficult task of determining whether the re-
sulting restriction is permissible.'76 Consequently,* in
American-Arab, the district court held that "even conceding
Congress's authority in the area of immigration, we are not
relieved of our duty to ensure that Congress exercises its pow-
er within constitutional limits."
77
In addition, the Supreme Court itself has stated that the
power to expel aliens is not free from judicial review to ensure
conformity with the Constitution. 78 In INS v. Chadha,'79
for the first time the Court found immigration legislation to be
unconstitutional. The statute in question dealt with a section
174. Ideological Exclusion, supra note 153, at 861.
175. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545
(1963).
176. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
177. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060,
1076 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
178. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1951). See also INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 941 (1983). Here, the Court stated that "'Congress has plenary authority
in all [areas] in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction . . . so long as the
exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction." Id.
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)).
179. 462 U.S. 919.
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of the Immigration and Naturalization Act which permitted
the attorney general to suspend the deportation of an other-
wise deportable alien but gave a legislative veto over such
suspension to either house of Congress."s The statute was
struck as a violation of the separation of powers required by
the Constitution. 8'
One of the explicit defenses to the constitutional challenge
in Chadha was grounded in the plenary powers doctrine."8 2
However, the Court summarily dismissed the defense, stating
that while the plenary authority of Congress over aliens is not
debatable, the issue of whether Congress has chosen a con-
stitutionally permissible means of implementing that power
is."' In this case, the Court did not defer to legislative judg-
ment but rather made its own determination of whether the
statute comported with constitutional doctrine. In Chadha, the
Court expressly rejected the view that the plenary power doc-
trine empowers Congress with uncircumscribed power over
immigration.' Rather, the Court ascribed to the view of
Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia." Where issues
of fundamental rights and plenary powers overlap, the Chief
Justice noted, "[q]uestions may occur which we would gladly
avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise
our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty.
" 186
Congress's plenary power over immigration and natural-
ization does not license courts to employ limited judicial re-
view. It does not relieve courts of the duty and responsibility to
contain Congressional exercises of power within the limits of
the Constitution."' Courts cannot justify their deference by
180. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2), repealed. by §
1254(a) (1982).
181. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 921.
182. Id. at 940.
183. Id. at 940-41.
184. Ideological Exclusion, supra note 153, at 866.
185. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1824).
186. Id. at 291.
187. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060,
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claiming that they have no place in the area of foreign affairs
and immigration. Our courts must realize that they have the
vital responsibility of guarding fundamental civil liberties.
That either foreign affairs or immigration find their way into
the same case with First Amendment challenges cannot justify
such a blatant abdication of judicial responsibility. The Ninth
Circuit's deferential attitude drains the Bill of Rights of its
value and triggers its transformation into a skeletal shadow of
what our founding fathers intended it to be.
C. The Standard of Constitutional Protection Afforded Resi-
dent Aliens
The Price court erroneously concluded that the appropriate
standard of judicial review to be applied was that of
Kleindienst v. Mandel. This standard calls on the government
to show a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason"" for its
inquiry. Under this standard, courts will not look behind a
legislature's exercise of discretion and will not test the legisla-
tive action by balancing its justification against those First
Amendment interests implicated. 89
Though the Court in Kleindienst did not label this test, the
standard resembles the rational basis test frequently employed
by courts to address economic challenges under the Constitu-
tion."9 Typically, if state action is challenged on the basis
that it infringes on economic rights of an individual or a busi-
ness, there is a presumption that the action is constitutional
unless it is not grounded upon a rational basis. 9' While such
limited judicial inquiry may be acceptable in challenges which
implicate commerce and the economy, this standard is not
defensible in the area of preferred fundamental rights. A mere
rational or facially legitimate relationship cannot justify in-
1076 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
188. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972).
189. Id.
190. See Robert Esig Beinstock, Immigration and the First Amendment, 73 CAL.
L. REv. 1889, 1906 (1985).
191. United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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fringement upon fundamental rights.192 Thus, the standard
should not have been applied in Price where First Amendment
associational rights were at stake.9 '
Furthermore, the Kleindienst standard should not have
been used in Price because the cases are completely distin-
guishable. Mr. Mandel was a revolutionary Marxist and a
citizen of Belgium seeking to enter the United States to speak
at several universities.'9 The lawsuit was brought by Mr.
Mandel and United States citizens who alleged that the denial
of Mr. Mandel's visa was a violation of their right to receive
information under the First Amendment.' The issue in
Kleindienst was whether the professor's First Amendment
rights were violated when his entry to the United States was
barred and whether this violation could compel the, attorney
general to issue a visa to Mr. Mandel."
Mr. Price, on the other hand, is not seeking to enter the
United States. He is a permanent resident alien seeking natu-
ralization. It is clear that a foreign national, unadmitted to the
United States, has no constitutional right of entry into this
country.'97 While deference to congressional immigration de-
cisions may be defensible when the alien is outside the United
States seeking to enter,'98 it is not warranted in Mr. Price's
situation. Resident aliens have traditionally been granted
192. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
193. This "facially legitimate" standard was questioned by Justice Marshall in
his Kleindienst dissent in which Justice Brennan joined:
I do not understand the source of this unusual standard. Merely "legiti-
mate" governmental interests cannot override constitutional rights. More-
over, the majority demands only "facial" legitimacy and good faith, by
which it means that this Court will never "look behind" any reason the
Attorney General gives. No citation is given for this kind of unprecedent-
ed deference to the Executive, nor can '1 imagine (nor am I told) the
slightest justification for such a rule.
408 U.S. at 777-78 (Marshall, Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 756.
195. Id. at 759.
196. Id. at 762.
197. Id.
198. Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836, 844 (9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
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constitutional protection. According to the Supreme Court in
Bridges v. Wixon, "once an alien lawfully enters and resides in
this country, he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to all people within our borders.""
Furthermore, the Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager noted
that aliens are "accorded a generous and ascending scale of
rights" as they increase their affiliation with the United
States."°0 Therefore, according to this line of cases, Mr. Price,
a permanent resident alien for almost three decades, is enti-
tled to a higher level of constitutional protection than that
afforded Mr. Mandel, a nonresident alien with no ties to this
country. A stricter level of scrutiny is merited in this case.
The deferential standard of review authorized in
Kleindienst further loses merit, as it relates to the First
Amendment, in light of the Court's decision in Landmark Com-
munications v. Virginia. 1 Here Chief Justice Burger empha-
sized that deference to a legislative decision cannot limit judi-
cial inquiry where First Amendment rights are at stake.0 2
He continued that if it were otherwise, "the scope of freedom of
speech and of the press would be subject to legislative defini-
tion and the function of the First Amendment as a check on
legislative power would be nullified."0 3 Therefore, he con-
cluded that courts must look behind "the legislative determina-
tion and examine" for themselves the constitutional legitimacy
of the particular act in question.2
199. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 160 (1935) (Murphy, J., concurring); see
also supra note 11. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution
assures resident aliens large measure of equal economic opportunity. See Yick.Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Taux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). They may
invoke the writ of habeas corpus to protect their personal liberty. See Nishumura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892). In criminal proceedings against
them they must be accorded the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); and unless they are enemy
aliens, their property cannot be taken without just compensation. See Russian
Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
200. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
201. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
202. Id. at 843.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 843-44.
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The Ninth Circuit majority in Price attempted to further
justify the deferential, rational basis standard by analogizing
the burden of proof required in deportation proceedings to the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied. The court
pointed out that in deportation proceedings, the government
must prove its case by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence."0 5 However, the alien carries the burden in natural-
ization proceedings."' This difference, according to the major-
ity, explains why "despite the sliding-scale theory of alien
rights,... aliens at naturalization are not necessarily entitled
to the full protection of the First Amendment arguably afford-
ed in deportation hearings." 7
The Price court reasoned that the judicial scrutiny should
be' greater when the government bears the burden of proof.
This equation is illogical. Burden of proof has never been a
talismanic indicator of an appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.
The Constitution does not tolerate such simplistic conclusions.
While the typical burden of proof in the rational basis test, as
used in economic constitutional challenges, rests with the chal-
lenger, in strict scrutiny cases challenging fundamental rights
the burden is shifted to the government; these correlative rela-
tionships are not conclusive of the appropriate standard of
judicial review to be applied.
It is completely unprecedented and unmerited to propose
that because the burden of proof lies on the petitioner in natu-
ralization proceedings, the courts of this country may apply
less than strict scrutiny to a First Amendment challenge. The
court permitted Mr. Price, a permanent resident alien of-thirty
years, to suffer a violation of his right to associate freely be-
cause the burden falls on him to prove his allegiance to this
country. While this burden of proof may be justifiable, its
translation into a lower level of judicial scrutiny for challenges
implicating fundamental constitutional rights is not. Such
205. Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836, 843 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Berenyi v.
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conclusions have no place in the judicial system of a land that
professes liberty and justice for all.
United States courts have recognized that resident aliens
are protected by the First Amendment"8 and have noted that
this attitude is crucial in a democratic society which requires
that every idea be equally protected whether set forth by a
citizen or an alien.0 9 Congress has also acknowledged that it
is "not in the interests of the United States to establish one
standard of ideology for citizens and another for foreigners who
wish to visit the United States."210 Moreover, nothing in the
Constitution restricts the protections of the First Amendment
to citizens. The Bill of Rights does not discriminate in the
distribution of its protections.21' Rather, it is color blind, gen-
der neutral, and applicable to both citizens and resident aliens
alike. As Professor Henkin of Columbia University has con-
cluded, "T]he rights our ancestors recognized as inherent and
unalienable knew neither bounds nor state boundaries."
212
Thus, discriminatory distribution of the First Amendment free-
doms is intolerable, as it stands in stark opposition to the
drafters' intent that the Bill of Rights protect all persons with-
in the United States from the power of government.21
Finally, resident aliens should be afforded the same level
of First Amendment protection as United States citizens be-
cause of basic notions of mutuality. Resident aliens live among
us, obey our laws, pay their taxes, and reasonably expect some
protection in return. As expressed by Justice Brennan, "If we
expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect
that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate, prose-
208. See supra note 11.
209. Anti-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1078
(C.D. Cal. 1989).
210. Id.
211. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 160 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
See also supra note 199.
212. Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual
Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 34 (1985).




cute and punish them."214 President Madison discussed mu-
tuality when he spoke out against the Alien and Sedition Acts:
It does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the Con-
stitution, as citizens are parties to it, that whilst they actual-
ly conform to it, they have no right to its protection. Aliens
are not more parties to the laws than they are parties to the
Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe, on
one hand, a temporary disobedience, they are entitled, in
return, to their protection and advantage.215
The Ninth Circuit Court's decision puts these fundamental
principles in question. Instead of adding to the uncertainty
surrounding the level of constitutional protections afforded to
resident aliens, the judiciary must implement these well set-
tled traditions once and for all and decide that judicial defer-
ence has no place in the context of First Amendment challeng-
es by resident aliens. Thus, rather than employ this deferential
standard to Mr. Price's challenge, the traditional First Amend-
ment strict scrutiny analysis should have been applied.
D. The Application of Strict Scrutiny
Infringements on the First Amendment rights of resident
aliens are to be accorded the same level of judicial scrutiny
applied to the First Amendment challenges of citizens. Under
the standard applied to citizens, when fundamental constitu-
tional rights are violated, the government action in question
will be prohibited unless the government can prove that the re-
striction was necessary to further a compelling governmental
interest.21 Applying this standard to the facts of Mr. Price's
214. Id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 259 (quoting Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800)),
reprinted in 4 Ellioes Debates 556 (2d ed. 1836)).
216. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 777 (1972) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Gibson v. Flori-
da Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (referring to a "legitimate and substantial" government pur-
pose).
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challenge, the government's action-its denial of his petition
for naturalization-is unconstitutional.
The government interest in proscribing the naturalization
of applicants who have been associated with communist groups
is legitimate but is not compelling. While such an interest
might have been deemed compelling enough to infringe on
First Amendment rights during the 1950s, the time of the Red
Scare, such interest is not compelling in the face of the
post-Cold War era of the 1990s. The Soviet Union no longer ex-
ists. The Iron Curtain is now a tattered sheet. Communism no
longer poses a threat to the United States, and arguably never
did. Today, our threats lie elsewhere-in the Persian Gulf, and
in the emerging mystery of a new world order-not in a lawful
resident alien such as Mr. Price who has sworn several times
over that he has never been a member of any of the groups
proscribed by section 1424(a) of the Act. In light of the chang-
ing political climate of our world, it is difficult to see any justi-
fication, let alone any compelling justification, for the sweep-
ing, suspicious inquiries of question 18. In the time of the 1940
Smith Ace" prosecutions, Justice Black dissented in Dennis
v. United States1 8 and wrote:
Public opinion what it now is, few will protest the conviction
of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that
in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears
subside, this or some later Court will restore the First
Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they
belong in a free society.19
217. The post-World War H prosecutions of Communist Party leaders were
brought under the Smith Act of 1940, which made it unlawful for any person to
advocate the overthrow of government by force or to organize persons who teach
the overthrow of government by force. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
218. Id. The defendants in Dennis were charged with violating the Smith Act
in that they willfully organized the Communist Party of the United States--an
organization that teaches and advocates the violent overthrow of the United States
government. The defendants' convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Court and
the statute was held constitutional under clear and present danger First Amend-
ment analysis. Id at 517.
219. Id. at 581.
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The calmer times spoken of by Justice Black are clearly upon
us. The restoration of First Amendment liberties to their pre-
ferred status in the context of resident aliens, however, has yet
to occur.
Even assuming a compelling state interest, this interest
alone does not justify the infringement upon Mr. Price's First
Amendment rights, as the government's method of effectuating
these goals was impermissible. In the case at hand, the means
by which the government chose to exercise its power, namely
by asking question 18, are not necessary to the achievement of
the government's objective. In Shelton v. Tucker,"' the Su-
preme Court emphasized that while the government interest
may only need to be "legitimate and substantial... [it] cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."22' Al-
ternative and effective means of obtaining the information
necessary to effectively screen naturalization applicants are
available. Namely, the government may pose responsive ques-
tions, such as question 19, which specifically inquire into
whether the petitioner has been a member of organizations
proscribed by section 1424(a). Also, character references may
be requested. Thus, other means of obtaining information are
available to the government to ensure that resident aliens
meet the qualifications of citizenship. However, questions
which disregard the constitutional requirement of narrow tai-
loring are not permissible.'
220. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
221. Id. at 488.
222. Judge Noonan dissented in Price v. INS and wrote:
A narrowly tailored question could be asked of any petitioner without
infringing on First Amendment rights. A petitioner could be asked if he
had belonged to any organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the
government or advocating or using terrorism or if he belonged to any
foreign military, paramilitary or intelligence organization. Such a question
would have an obvious relevance to the governmenfs legitimate concerns.
A question without bounds as to association has no relation to govern-
mental concerns.
962 F.2d 836, 845 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Mr. Price did all that was necessary to satisfy the
government's interest when he answered negatively to all
questions inquiring into his association with groups proscribed
by section 1424(a).2" Furthermore, he swore twice that he
had never been a member of or associated with any such
groups.' Any further probing by the government is unneces-
sary to the pursuit of a legitimate or compelling governmental
objective. It is absurd for the government to contend that Mr.
Price might not know if a group he has joined was proscribed
by the Act. Mr. Price, a citizen of Great Britain living and
working in the United States for almost three decades, surely
has the capability of determining whether or not he is a mem-
ber of a Communist or subversive group. The philosophies of
such groups are not-so mysterious. If Mr. Price were a member
of a group advocating the violent overthrow of government, it
is safe to assume he would be aware of it. Furthermore, if he
were unaware of the nature of the organization to which he
belonged, how dangerous could he be? The government's highly
speculative concerns regarding Mr. Price's possible associations
cannot override his First Amendment rights. No legitimate
state interest is furthered by questions which tread into areas
of belief and association protected from government intru-
*sion.M
The government's limitless inquiry in Price is also incon-
sistent with Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, where the Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment prevented the state bar
review committee from inquiring into whether applicants to
the bar had been members of the Communist Party."6 While
the Court conceded that the state had a legitimate interest in
ensuring the high moral character of those admitted to practice
law, the Court found that the state's means were unnecessary
to achieve its objective.' 7 Since the petitioner had already
223. Id. at 838-39.
224. Id.
225. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 31 (1971).
226. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
227. Id. at 7.
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supplied the committee with extensive personal and profes-
sional information 8 relevant to her fitness to practice
law, 9 such as lists of employers, law school professors, and
other references,20 any other inquiries were held to violate
her First Amendment rights.
A similar conclusion was reached in In re Stolar.2 '
There, the petitioner refused to answer questions on his bar
application which inquired into his affiliation with groups
advocating the violent overthrow of government.1 2 The appli-
cation also requested a list of any and all associations of which
he was or ever had been a member. 3 This question, which is
hauntingly similar to that upheld in Price, was struck down by
the Supreme Court. Justice Black concluded that Mr. Stolar
had supplied the state with extensive information with which
it could determine his fitness to practice law.' Citing Baird
and Shelton, the Court held that the petitioner's refusal to
answer both questions was protected by the First Amend-
ment 5 which bars a state, from penalizing a person solely
because he or she is a member of a particular organiza-
tion. 6
Similarly, the government action in Price is clearly uncon-
stitutional, because the means employed-question 18-were
not narrowly tailored to the achievement of a legitimate gov-
ernment objective. Question 18 is precisely the type of inquiry
admonished and invalidated by our courts when protecting
citizens' fundamental rights. As it would with citizens, this
question infringed on Mr. Price's associational freedoms and
inquired into areas in which the government has no legitimate
interest. Since the question's sweeping inquiry is analogous to
228. Id at 4-5.
229. Id. at 7.
230. Id.
231. 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
232. Id. at 26-27.
233. Id,
234. Id. at 29.
235. Id. at 31.
236. Id. at 29.
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those criticized and prohibited by the Supreme Court in
Shelton, Baird and Stolar, it too must be eliminated.
In defense of government action, the American-Arab court
pointed out that the government's interests in immigration and
naturalization "are adequately protected... by the prevailing
First Amendment standard allowing for the deportation of
individuals who advocate imminent lawless action and whose
speech is likely to induce such action.""7 These interests, are
safeguarded, as the government may also deport when mem-
bership in an association threatens national security.238 Addi-
tionally, the government can enact laws to further its compel-
ling interests as long as they are narrowly tailored.3 9 Thus,
the government's interests are adequately safeguarded within
the parameters of traditional First Amendment tests,20 but
Congress's overzealous pursuit of its interests in immigration
and naturalization must be contained.
Therefore, Mr. Price's right to associate freely may not be
curtailed in the manner sought by the government. Question
18 unnecessarily invaded his privacy and crossed the line from
legitimate inquiry to abuse of power. Even though the attorney
general's inquiry was made under the shelter of plenary pow-
ers of immigration and naturalization, such naked abuses of
power and blatant violations of preferred rights cannot survive
constitutional review.
When strict scrutiny is applied, Mr. Price's First Amend-
ment challenge must succeed. The government's interest, dur-
ing this post-Cold War era, is not of sufficient weight to merit
an abridgment of Mr. Price's First Amendment rights. Second,
even assuming, arguendo, that the government's interest is
substantial, the means chosen to effectuate its objective were
not narrowly tailored. Rather, question 18's nonresponsive,
sweeping inquiry chills Mr. Price's associational rights in a
237. Anti-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1082
n.18 (1989) (quoting Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).





manner that is unacceptable under the Constitution. Mr.
Price's First Amendment rights, guaranteed to him as a per-
manent resident alien by the Bill of Rights,"' were violated.
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to correct this violation is a sad
commentary on the insight and awareness of our judicial sys-
tem.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Price denied John Eric
Price the First Amendment protections he is afforded by the
Bill of Rights. First, the court's reading of the Act was
impermissibly broad, as it sustained question 18's inquiry into
associations and organizations not listed in section 1424(a) and
not material to his naturalization petition. 2 Furthermore, in
allowing the attorney general to conduct an ad hoc determina-
tion of what groups may be proscribed by the Act, the court
allowed Mr. Price's associational rights to be chilled and his
due process rights to notice violated.
Second, the Ninth Circuit improperly used the plenary
power and political qu6ation doctrines to refrain from a mean-
ingful review of Mr. Price's First Amendment challenge. These
doctrines cannot excuse our courts from performing their vital
function as guardians of liberty. Rather, the powers of Con-
gress and the executive, even in the area of foreign affairs,
must be consistently exercised within the parameters of the
Constitution. If such deferential review is to continue, the
dreams of those people drawn to our country in hopes of escap-
ing tyranny and oppression will remain visions of a far-off
future not realized in today's lifetime.
Instead of applying the deferential standard of Kleindienst,
which curiously'demands mere legitimate and bona fide rea-
sons for the exercise of governmental restrictions, the court
should have applied the traditional strict scrutiny analysis to
Mr. Price's constitutional challenge. Under this standard, ques-
241. See supra note 11.
242. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
1993] 723
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
tion 18 cannot pass constitutional muster, for it is not a neces-
sary means to the fulfillment of a compelling government ob-
jective.
With its decision in Price, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals joins the ranks of courts which, under the guise of the
plenary-power and political question doctrines, turn a blind eye
to violations of First Amendment rights.
John Eric Price has lived in this country for almost thirty
years. He pays taxes and obeys the laws imposed upon him by
this government as every good citizen of this nation does. Does
being an American boil down to having a piece of paper with
the word "citizen" written across it? Absent that document, is
Mr. Price any less deserving of protection than those born
here? Apparently so, according to the Ninth Circuit.
This decision makes certain facts painfully clear. The First
Amendment of the United States Constitution does not now
protect resident aliens from government abuses. Courts may
ignore infringements upon constitutional rights of resident
aliens and justify their blinders by invoking the plenary pow-
ers and political question doctrines. The United States is no
longer a country which affords liberty and justice for all, but,
rather, is one that dishes out its freedoms only to those lucky
enough to be called citizens.
This decision puts in question the other fundamental
rights allegedly afforded resident aliens under the Constitu-
tion.' Does limited First Amendment protection mean the
rest of the Bill of Rights will suffer the same fate? Will its
protections shrink at the sight of a person not bearing the
papers of a citizen? Will police officers be able to arrest resi-
dent aliens on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, rather than
probable cause? What "process" is now due resident aliens?
Will the full protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments be afforded non-citizens, while those of the First Amend-
243. Among those rights afforded resident aliens are those contained in the
First and Fifth Amendments and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 160 (Murphy, J., concurring); 8ee
also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
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ment are selectively distributed? After Price, the answers to
these questions lie somewhere in a future that is both a mys-
tery and a potential nightmare.
Andrea Strong

